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1 Introduction
The last forty years have seen a number of proposals to approximate corporate tax
bases and tax rates in Europe in order to level the playing field for business com-
petition. The recent report by the European Commission on the future of company
taxation in Europe (Commission of the European Communities, 2001), points out
that diﬀerences in national corporate tax systems aﬀect location decisions of firms,
impose barriers to cross-border investments, impair the eﬃciency in the capital
market, and foster international tax planning.1 To remedy these problems the Com-
mission argues that there is a need for coordination of corporate tax systems among
EU member states. The Commission’s report shows that there is large variation in
eﬀective corporate tax rates across EU member states due to tax rate and tax base
diﬀerentials. The Commission’s main proposal is to move towards a consolidated tax
base for European multinational companies, to be allocated across member states
through a formula apportionment system. This proposal entails a certain degree of
tax base harmonization. The alternative road ahead pointed out by the Commis-
sion, is one of harmonization of national tax bases and tax rates within the current
system of corporate taxation systems among the EU member states.2
The need for a level playing field in the European Union has also been highlighted
recently by the entry of new EU member states whose eﬀective tax rates often are
significantly below those of ’old’ member states. Illustrative of the problem is Nicolas
Sarkozy (French Secretary of the Interior and at the time minister of finance and
economic aﬀairs) who proposed to refuse payment of most EU-subsidies (i.e., from
Structural Funds) to the new EU-countries, whose eﬀective tax rates are significantly
below EU-average, in order to prevent their tax advantage from creating ”excessive”
tax competition.3
This paper argues that the discussion over tax rates and base approximation
has overlooked the eﬀects harmonization of tax bases or tax rates may have on
the stability of international cartels. We show that harmonization of tax rates may
increase or decrease collusive behavior, but that the most likely outcome is that it
1For a survey of proposals and the recent, so-called Bolkestein-report of the EU see Devereux
(2004), Mintz (2004) and Sørensen (2004).
2Mintz (2004) argues that the focus should be on tax bases rather than tax rates.
3See, e.g., Financial Times Deutschland, September 7, 2004, and Neue Züricher Zeitung, Sep-
tember 8, 2004. Countries like, i.e., Lithuania or Hungary have lowered their (eﬀective) tax rates
to 13% resp. 16% in order to attract multinationals from established member states.
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reinforces incentives to stay in cartels. Furthermore, any type of harmonization of
tax bases is always undesirable from society’s point of view, but bilateral and full
harmonization to a common standard is worse than unilateral harmonization to a
minimum tax standard.4 The implication of our analysis is that, on the one hand,
there are very clear negative eﬀects of harmonization on collusive behavior, but on
the other hand, there are benefits of a level playing field for corporate taxation
systems. A full analysis of corporate tax reform needs to address these eﬀects in a
unified framework. This is a topic that is left for future research.
Collusive behavior in an international setting has been confirmed by a number
of studies and many of these are summarized in Haufler and Schjelderup (2004).
In short, international collusive behavior has been established in industries such as
pharmaceutical, chemical, cars, diamonds, telecommunications, uranium yellowcake,
Canadian potash, cement, plastic pipe, electronics, and wood pulp.5 Cooperation
within these industries involves price fixing schemes that in some cases have been
going on for a decade or more. The costs of such activities, as documented in the
empirical literature, are substantial.6 The potential damage to the economy by car-
tels has been highlighted in Monti (2001); ”Estimations by the OECD in its recent
Report on Hard Core Cartels7 have provided dramatic figures. The average in-
crease from price fixing is estimated to amount to 10% of the selling price and the
corresponding reduction of output to be as high as 20%. In some recent big cases
prices have been increased by the cartel participants 30% to 50%.”8
The fighting of cartels has been a clear priority of the European Commission.
It is therefore a paradox that no link has been made to the possible eﬀects of tax
harmonization on collusive behavior in the Commission’s reports on corporation tax
systems.
The issue of tax harmonization has been discussed extensively in the public fi-
nance literature in relation to fiscal externalities between countries. The canonical
tax competition model predicts that competition among countries over mobile cap-
4The latter approach has been adopted by the EU in its eﬀorts to harmonize commodity taxes.
See Haufler and Schjelderup (2004) for an analysis.
5See Haufler and Schjelderup (2004) for a survey.
6See e.g., Slade (1995), Scherer (1996), King (1997) and Steen and Sørgard (1999).
7OECD 2000.
8The industries involved are graphite electrodes and citric acid.
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ital leads to too low tax rates and underprovision of public goods in equilibrium.9
From this model follows the policy recommendation that tax coordination or har-
monization is desirable in order to correct the fiscal externality from competition.
However, this view is challenged by the Public Choice literature. Here the argument
is that competition in general, and competition among governments in particular, is
beneficial because it reduces government waste and disciplines politicians.10 These
studies, however, do not have competition and collusive behavior as their focal point.
Related to our study is Gendron (2001) who in a closed economy setting analyzes
the eﬀect on collusion of alternative loss oﬀset provisions under the corporation tax.
He finds that an increase in refunds of tax losses may enhance collusive behavior.
More recently, Haufler and Schjelderup (2004) analyze the choice of international
tax principle in commodity taxation and how it aﬀects cartel stability. Their results
are in line with the results presented in this paper. They find that tax harmonization
strengthens collusive behavior irrespective of commodity tax principle in place. To
our knowledge there are no other studies that are directly comparable to ours or to
the Haufler and Schjelderup study.
Our results are brought forward by using a standard model of dynamic price
competition and tacit collusion.11 The framework is a two-country, two-firm set-
ting, where the national product markets are of equal size and costs of production
are the same for both firms in order to highlight how diﬀerences in national tax
systems aﬀect the stability of cartels. Section 2 outlines the model and section 3
analyzes cartel stability. Section 4 investigates the eﬀects of bilateral and unilateral
tax harmonization, while section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider two firms, labelled by i ∈ {1, 2}, which are located in country 1 and 2,
respectively. They produce amounts xi of an identical and homogenous good, and
9See the seminal papers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). A survey of the
literature is given in Wilson (1999).
10E.g., Brennan and Buchanan (1980), McLure (1986), and more recently Rauscher (1998).
11The same model has previously been used to study ‘reciprocal dumping’ in a trade context (see
Pinto, 1986), to compare tariﬀs and quotas (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1989), to study the eﬀects of
trade liberalization as in Lommerud and Sørgard (2001), and to compare diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes (Meckl, 1996). Recently, Haufler and Schjelderup (2004) have studied how international
principles of value-added taxation aﬀect the stability of collusive agreements.
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tacit collusion between the two firms implies that both firms refrain from exporting.
Each firm is thus a monopolist in its home market. In each period, either firm may
defect from this implicit agreement and export to the other market, but such action
causes future retaliation by the other firm. If firm i defects, it does so in the first
period (t = 0) and exports to country j. It will catch firm j by surprise and we
define this as the deviation phase of the game. In the following period(s), however,
firm j retaliates by exporting to market i. This is the punishment phase of the game.
Furthermore, as in the literature on repeated games we assume a trigger strategy
which implies that firm j will retaliate by exporting to market i in all subsequent
periods. Hence, if one firm defects in period t = 0, duopoly competition prevails
in both markets in t = 1, 2, ...∞. Furthermore, we assume that national markets
are segmented, i.e., diﬀerent producer prices can be set in the two national markets
under both monopolistic and duopolistic market structures.
In the following, we denote by πMi the profit of firm i if it acts as a monopolist in
its domestic market, πEi is the extra profit in period 0 when firm i defects and exports
into the other market, and πDi is the total duopoly profit (earned in both markets to-
gether) of firm i under mutual export competition. Denoting δi as the discount factor
of firm i (0 < δi < 1), defection from the cartel solution is unprofitable whenever the
present value of staying forever in the cartel, πMi / (1− δi) , is greater than or equal
to the profits of defecting from the agreement, that is, (πMi + π
E
i ) + π
D
i δi/ (1− δi).
Thus, we can write the “stability condition” for the collusive agreement as:12
θi ≥ θ¯i =
πEi
πMi − πDi
, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, (1)
where θi ≡ δi/(1− δi) is the relative discount factor of firm i, and θ¯i is the size of
this rate that just leaves the firm indiﬀerent between staying in the secret cartel and
defecting. The critical values θ¯i diﬀer between the two firms (as will become clear
later) due to diﬀerences in the corporate tax system. In general, it is the firm with
the higher critical value of θ¯i, which is more likely to break the collusive arrangement.
Hence it is this firm’s θ¯i that is binding for the stability of the secret cartel.13 For the
12We assume that πMi > πDi holds throughout the analysis.
13As pointed out by Haufler and Schjelderup (2004): If firm j has the higher critical value of θ¯,
then firm i (i 6= j) could improve the stability of the collusive agreement by oﬀering firm j a new
contract (for example a fifty-fifty split of the two markets). Such market sharing, however, poses
a problem. The reason is that it is much easier to detect a breach of agreement if a firm exports
(when it should not) than if it produces beyond the agreed export quota. The cost of monitoring,
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analysis to come, it is useful to note that the higher θ¯i is under a given scenario, the
lower is the likelihood that the collusive agreement is stable, since a smaller range
of (common) relative discount factors θ sustains the cartel solution.
3 Profits and cartel stability
We assume that the size of the market in each country is the same and that firms
have the same costs. Demand functions in both markets are linear and given by
xi = a − pi, where pi is the consumer price, xi is demand, and a > 0 is a market
size parameter that denotes maximum sales at a price of zero which is identical for
both countries. In principle we could allow market size diﬀerences, but the purpose
here is to investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerences in corporate tax systems only, and we
therefore refrain from analyzing the interaction of taxes with other parameters.14
The economic profit of the firm is
πi = pixi − cxi, i = 1, 2.
where c is (constant) marginal cost.
We assume that taxable profit diﬀers from economic profit to capture the idea
that tax deductible costs in practice deviate from true costs. The deviation may
be given various interpretations. First, it is a fact in many countries that certain
categories of costs are not tax deductible. Notable examples are alcoholic drinks and
bribes. Second, and more importantly, the dividing line between what is deemed an
expense - that can be deducted immediately - and what is deemed an investment,
which is written oﬀ over time, is based on judgement that may not reflect the
true economic cost. Third, one may also consider incomplete cost deductions as a
proxy for the distortion imposed on firms by the inability of governments to set tax
deductible depreciation rates equal to true depreciation rates.15
therefore, provides cartels with an incentive to set up exclusive territories (see Marvel, 1982, and
Tirole, 1988, pp. 183 and 185).
14The eﬀect of diﬀerences in market size on cartel stability is examined in Haufler and Schjelderup
(2004) in a context of commodity taxes.
15The latter problem is well known in public finance and has various eﬀects on firm behavior.
See Sinn (1987).
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Taxable profit is given by
πτi = pixi − γicxi, i = 1, 2.
where γi is the share of marginal costs that is tax deductible. In principle γi R 1,
so if γi < 1, deductions are incomplete in the sense that deductions fall short of
true costs, whilst if γi > 1 deductions are too generous. Only when γi = 1 are tax
deductible costs equal to true costs and the corporate tax system is neutral (i.e.,
does not aﬀect firm behavior).
Denoting ti as the corporate tax rate after tax profit is
Πi = πi − tiπτi = (a− pi) [pi (1− ti)− c (1− γiti)]
= (1− ti) (a− pi)
∙
pi − c · 1− γiti
1− ti
¸
. (2)
Maximizing Πi with respect to price (or quantity) yields optimal price, quantity,
and profit as
pi =
(a+ c˜i)
2
, xi =
(a− c˜i)
2
, and πMi =
1− ti
4
α2i (3)
where c˜i (γi, ti) ≡
1−γiti
1−ti c ≡ ²ic is the eﬀective after tax marginal cost and αi ≡
(a− c˜i) > 0 for positive sales to occur. ²i is a tax wedge. If the tax code allows full
deductibility of costs (γi = 1) we have that ²i = 1, and c˜i = c. The corporate tax
rate is then lump sum in nature, since it does not aﬀect the behavior of the firm. In
general we assume that this neutrality property does not hold.
From (2) it then follows that the tax code in fact implements two taxes. First,
we have a tax on pure economic profits with tax rate ti. Second, there is a tax on
costs with tax rate τ i = ²i − 1. When γi > 1 this implies a subsidy on costs while
the opposite is true if 0 < γi < 1.
For ease of exposition we sometimes refer to a situation where a country is a low
tax country. By this we mean;
Definition 1 Country i is a low tax country if it has a constellation of tax rate and
tax deductibility rule that makes the firm located in country i a low cost firm that is,
c˜j > c˜i (⇔ ²j > ²i, i 6= j) .
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For given symmetrical marginal costs c, Definition 1 implies a combination of tax
rates and deductibility rules such that either condition (i) or (ii) below is satisfied:
(i) ti ≤ tj and 1 > γi ≥ γj,16 or
(ii) ti ≤ tj and γi ≥ γj > 1, whereby the diﬀerence in tax rates is small enough or
the diﬀerence in deductibility rules is large enough in order to sustain ²j > ²i.17
In what follows we assume that country 1 is the low tax country and thus that
firm 1 has the lowest marginal costs (i.e., c˜1 < c˜2).
3.1 Deviation from cartel agreement
If firm 1 deviates and exports to country 2 in period 1, it sets a price on its ex-
ports (p12) equal to its monopoly price in country 1, since this price - given firm
10s tax advantage over firm 2 - is below the monopoly price of firm 2. Hence,
p12 =
1
2
(a+ c˜1) < p2. As a consequence, πE1
¡
= πM1
¢
> πM2 , and profit from devi-
ating is
πE1 =
1− t1
4
α21. (4)
If firm 2 deviates and exports to country 1, it cannot use its profit maximizing
(monopoly) price since p2 > p1. Therefore, the best strategy for firm 2 is to slightly
undercut the price of firm 1 by setting its export price p21 just below
(a+c˜1)
2
(= p1) ,
thereby sweeping the market and earning profit of
πE2 =
(1− t2)
4
α1 [α1 − 2 (c˜2 − c˜1)] . (5)
In the punishment phase, both firms compete over prices. Since firm 1 is located
in the low tax country it has the lower eﬀective marginal costs (c˜1 < c˜2) . Thus,
it will set its price marginally below the eﬀective marginal cost of firm 2, that is,
c˜2. Since goods are homogeneous, firm 1 is then the sole provider in both markets,
and earns a profit in each country equal to (a− p1) [p1 (1− t1)− c (1− γ1t1)]. Total
16Note that ∂c˜i∂γi = −
tic
1−ti < 0, thus an increase in tax deductible costs decreases the eﬀective
cost of the firm for all values of γi.
17These restrictions are necessary because ∂c˜i∂ti =
1−γi
(1−ti)2 c < 0 if γi > 1.
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profit in both markets corresponds to these expressions multiplied by 2 and can be
written as
πD1 = 2(1− t1)α2 (c˜2 − c˜1) .
In contrast, firm 2 derives profit of
πD2 = 0,
in the punishment period.
The critical discount factors for firm 1 and firm 2 can now be written as
θ¯1 =
α21
α21 − 8α2(c˜2 − c˜1)
, (6)
θ¯2 =
α1 [α1 − 2(c˜2 − c˜1)]
α22
. (7)
3.2 National diﬀerences in corporate tax systems
In this section we consider equations (6) and (7) in order to determine which firm is
more likely to defect from the collusive agreement, depending on assumptions made
about national diﬀerences in the corporate tax system.
Proposition 1. It is always the firm located in the low tax country (firm 1) that
is more likely to break the collusive agreement.
Proof : From Definition 1 we have that since firm 1 is located in a low tax
country, then, (c˜2 − c˜1) > 0 and α1 = a − c˜1 > a − c˜2 = α2. Thus, the numerators
(Nθ¯i) in equations (6) and (7) relate to each other as follows: Nθ¯1 > Nθ¯2 . For the
denominators Dθ¯1 and Dθ¯2 , we can use α1 = α2+(c˜2− c˜1) and binomial rules in the
denominator of (6), to get; Dθ¯1 = α
2
1−8α2(c˜2− c˜1) = [α2 − (c˜2 − c˜1)]
2−4α2(c˜2− c˜1),
which shows that Dθ¯1 < Dθ¯2 = α
2
2, as c˜2 > c˜1. Taken together we have that Nθ¯1 >
Nθ¯2 and Dθ¯1 < Dθ¯2 , which unambiguously implies θ¯1 > θ¯2. ¤
Intuitively, a firm located in a low tax country can gain more than a firm located
in a high tax country by defecting from the collusive agreement. The reason is that
its cost advantage implies higher profit both in the deviation and in the punishment
phase of the game. The low cost firm, therefore, has a smaller range of discount
factors (i.e., a higher relative discount factor θ) that sustains the cartel solution.
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4 Tax Harmonization
We start with the same basic premise as in the previous sections namely that country
1 is a low tax country and firm 1 is a low cost firm. We define a harmonizing company
tax reform as one which narrows or eliminates the diﬀerence between tax rates
and/or deductability rates. We shall refer to unilateral harmonization as the case
where one country changes its tax parameters to a minimum standard. Unilateral
harmonization has been the vehicle for harmonization of commodity taxes within
the European Union. An alternative is to consider a bilateral harmonization process
where both countries change their tax rates and/or deductability rules to a common
tax and/or deductability rule.18
We examine the eﬀects of harmonization by investigating tax base and tax rate
harmonization separately. This is done in order to: (i) compare bilateral and uni-
lateral harmonization to see if one is preferable over the other, and (ii) investigate
whether it is better to harmonize tax bases or tax rates. Underlying the discussion
is an implicit view that monopoly and cartels are undesirable from society’s point of
view. With equal weights on consumer and producer surplus, it is well known that
monopoly produces a deadweight loss that can be reduced by promoting competi-
tion.
4.1 Harmonization of corporate tax rates
Bilateral harmonization. Starting from γ1 > γ2 and t1 < t2, bilateral harmoniza-
tion of tax rates to a common level implies dt1 > 0 and dt2 < 0, and we assume
that dt1 = t2−t12 and dt2 = −
t2−t1
2
. Firm 1 is the most likely firm to defect from the
cartel. Let dθ¯B1 denote the change in firm 1’s critical discount rate under bilateral
harmonization. Then
dθ¯
B
1 =
µ
∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂t1
− ∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂t2
¶
t2 − t1
2
. (8)
Although ∂θ¯1∂c˜1 < 0,
∂c˜i
∂²i
> 0, and ∂θ¯1∂c˜2 > 0 (see the Appendix), the precise eﬀect
of the tax rate on the firm’s eﬀective cost depends on the size of the tax deduction
18Both bilateral and unilateral approaches to harmonization have been studied in the tax liter-
ature. See Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Keen (1987, 1989).
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parameter γ, since
∂²i
∂ti
=
1− γi
(1− ti)2
(
> 0 if γi < 1
< 0 if γi > 1
. (9)
Using (8) and (9) we find that
dθ¯
B
1
(
< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1
(10)
When the tax code implies incomplete deductions (γi < 1), bilateral harmonization
stabilizes the cartel. Increasing the tax rate in country 1 raises eﬀective production
costs by firm 1 and narrows the cost diﬀerential between the two firms thereby
reducing the gain to firm 1 from defecting. Furthermore, lowering the tax rate in
country 2 reduces the profit of firm 1 in the punishment phase, since the price
firm 1 can charge is a decreasing function of firm 2’s eﬀective costs (c˜2). In either
case, bilateral harmonization when γi < 1 increases the range of discount rates that
supports the cartel solution for firm 1.
In contrast, when the tax deductibility parameter implies a subsidy on costs
(γi > 1), bilateral harmonization destabilizes the cartel. An increase in the tax rate
in country 1 enhances the cost advantage of firm 1 thereby making it more attractive
to deviate. Similarly, a decrease in the tax rate in country 2 lowers the subsidy to
firm 2 and increases its eﬀective costs (c˜2) allowing firm 1 to earn higher profit in
the punishment phase. Consequently, firm 1 is more likely to break out of the cartel.
Unilateral harmonization. Under unilateral harmonization of corporate tax
rates, only one country changes its tax rate and the approach taken in the European
Union has been to impose a minimum rate that low tax countries must comply with.
In line with this we assume that the low tax country (country 1) must adhere to
a minimum tax rate tmin1 . Given that t1 < t
min
1 < t2 to begin with, country 1 must
increase its tax rate to tmin1 whilst country 2 keeps its rate constant. To make our
analysis comparable to the bilateral harmonization above, we assume that minimum
taxation implies an increase in country 1 by dt1 = t2−t12 . Define dθ¯
U
1 as the change
in firm 1’s critical discount rate under bilateral harmonization. Then,
dθ¯
U
1 =
∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂t1
t2 − t1
2
, (11)
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where the sign of dθ¯U1 depends on the size of γi. In particular,
dθ¯
U
1
(
< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1.
(12)
Qualitatively the result is the same as under bilateral harmonization. Comparing
unilateral and bilateral harmonization we know from (10) and (12) that dθ¯i1 < (>) 0,
i = B,U, if γi < (>) 1. In particular,
dθ¯
B
1 −dθ¯
U
1 = −
t2 − t1
2
µ
∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂t2
¶(
< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1
(13)
Bilateral harmonization strengthens the collusive agreement more than unilateral
harmonization when γi < 1, whilst bilateral harmonization weakens the cartel more
than unilateral harmonization when γi > 1. Based on (8), (11), and (13) we may
draw the following conclusions;
Proposition 2. Bilateral and unilateral harmonization of corporate tax rates
strengthens (weakens) collusive behavior if tax deductible costs are below (above)
true economic costs. Bilateral harmonization strengthens the cartel solution more
than unilateral harmonization when γi < 1, whilst bilateral harmonization weakens
the cartel solution more than unilateral harmonization when γi > 1.
4.2 Harmonization of tax bases
Bilateral harmonization. We now consider the case of tax base harmonization
from the starting point t1 < t2 and γ1 > γ2 with firm 1 as the low-cost firm. Bilateral
harmonization to a common rate implies dγ1 = −
γ1−γ2
2
< 0 and dγ2 =
γ1−γ2
2
> 0,
and the change in the critical discount factor is
dθ¯
B
1 =
µ
−∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂γ1
+
∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂γ2
¶
γ1 − γ2
2
(14)
Using (see the Appendix) ∂θ¯1∂c˜1 < 0,
∂c˜i
∂²i
> 0 and ∂θ¯1∂c˜2 > 0, (14) and
∂²i
∂γi
= − ti
1− ti
< 0 for all ti ∈ (0, 1), (15)
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we have that
dθ¯
B
1 < 0. (16)
Harmonizing tax bases bilaterally makes collusive agreements more stable. Narrow-
ing the diﬀerential in tax bases shrinks the cost advantage of the low cost firm and
reduces profit in the deviation and punishment phase.
Unilateral harmonization. Under unilateral harmonization there is a binding
ceiling for depreciations implemented with γ2 < γ
max < γ1. If we again assume
that the ceiling, γmax, is the mean of the tax parameters, γ1 and γ2, this requires
a change in the low-tax country tax base according to dγ1 = −
γ1−γ2
2
. This changes
the critical discount factor of firm 1 as follows
dθ¯
U
1 = −
∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂γ1
γ1 − γ2
2
< 0, (17)
where from the comparative static results presented above it is clear that harmo-
nization of the tax base even to a minimum level stabilizes the cartel, since it reduces
firm 1’s incentives to deviate. Comparing bilateral and and unilateral harmonization
by taking the diﬀerence of (16) and (17) we obtain,
dθ¯
B
1 −dθ¯
U
1 =
µ
γ1 − γ2
2
¶
∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂γ2
< 0. (18)
It is clear from (18) that bilateral harmonization has a greater impact on the
critical discount factor, thus
Proposition 3. Both bilateral and unilateral harmonization of tax bases strength-
ens incentives for collusion, but the eﬀect is larger under bilateral harmonization.
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 it is seen that cartel stability is diﬀerently af-
fected by tax rate and tax base harmonization. In the latter case harmonization
(unilateral or bilateral) reinforces incentives to stay in the cartel. In contrast, the
stability of a cartel under tax rate harmonization depends on the size of the tax
deductibility rate. Too generous deduction rules (γ > 1) destabilize collusive agree-
ments due to the fact that deduction rules in combination with the tax rate are a
subsidy (if γ > 1) that lowers costs of the low tax firm and enhances its profit in
the deviation and punishment phase.
If we relax the assumption of marginal costs being identical in both countries
all our results hold and are even enforced if the low cost firm resides in the low tax
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country, that is, if ²i < ²j and ci < cj. Crucial for our results then is that Definition
1 is fulfilled. If the opposite constellation is present, that is, ²i < ²j but ci > cj,
the high cost firm is harmed by harmonization, since the cost diﬀerential is widened
when the low tax country increases its eﬀective tax burden. Harmonization then
delivers a double dividend in the sense that it enhances competition and weakens the
incentive for cartel formation. However, strong anecdotical evidence indicates that
the latter case is less realistic. Wages and taxes in the Eastern European countries,
for example, are substantially lower than in Western Europe indicating that low tax
countries host low cost firms.
4.3 Extension to several countries
Our analysis can be extended to the case of several countries (i.e., n > 2). Using
the same set-up as above where diﬀerences in the tax system are the only source of
variety, we focus on two cases. In case (i) country 1 is a low-tax country and there
are (n− 1) identical high tax countries. In case (ii) there are two countries, 1 and
2, hosting firms with an identical low-cost structure, and (n− 2) countries hosting
high-cost firms.
In both cases above, a low-cost firm i earns profit ΠEi = (n− 1)πEi if it deviates
from the cartel and exports to the other (n− 1) countries in period 1. As in Section
3.1 it catches its competitors by surprise and sets its monopoly price pi < pj ∀ j,
j 6= i in the deviation phase. Profit in the deviation phase is now (n − 1) times
higher than previously and ceteris paribus, this weakens cartel stability. However,
there may be an oﬀsetting eﬀect (depending on assumptions) since there are more
firms that can export to the home market of the firm that breaches the collusive
agreement. As a consequence, profit in the punishment phase may fall, and ceteris
paribus, this eﬀect enforces incentives to stay in the cartel. Which of these two eﬀects
dominates depends on the relative magnitudes of these eﬀects and diﬀers in cases
(i) and (ii).
To be specific, in case (i), there are (n− 1) identical high tax countries and profit
in each of these countries in the punishment period is (as before) zero, whilst the
low-cost firm earns a positive profit. Profit in the deviation phase by the low cost
firm (firm 1) is ΠD1 = (n− 1)πD1 , and is increasing in the number of countries. Thus,
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the critical discount factor of the low-cost firm can be written as
Θ¯i =
ΠE1
πM1 −ΠD1
=
(n− 1) · πE1
πM1 − (n− 1) · πD1
=
πE1
πM1
n−1 − πD1
>
πE1
π1 − πD1
= θ¯1. (19)
The likelihood of firm i leaving the cartel increases in the number of high-tax
countries, as the critical discount factor of the low-cost firm increases disproportion-
ate to the number of countries. Moreover, it can be shown that
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜i
= −
2αi
h
α2i
n−1 − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)
i
+
α2i
n−1 [6αi − 8(c˜j − c˜i) + (n− 2)8α2]h
α2i
n−1 − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)
i2 < 0, (20)
and
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜j
=
8α2i [αi − 2 (c˜j − c˜i)]h
α2i
n−1 − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)
i2 > 0. (21)
Thus, qualitatively the eﬀects of harmonizing either tax rates or tax bases are
unchanged, if we extend the analysis to several high-tax countries.
In case (ii), where there are two identical low-cost firms, the relevant critical
discount factor changes significantly. In the punishment phase, firm 1, which is
assumed to break the collusive agreement, has to cope with the other low-cost firm
and, hence, the price is driven down to equal the eﬀective marginal cost in all markets
under attack. Thus, profit in the punishment phase will be equal to zero and we get
Θ¯i =
ΠEi
πMi
= (n− 1) π
E
i
πMi
= n− 1 i = {1, 2}, (22)
because πEi = π
M
i from (3) and (4). Compared with the original two-country model,
the increased profit in the deviation phase increases the critical discount factor,
whereas the vanishing profits in the punishment phase have a depressing eﬀect. This
trade-oﬀ remains ambiguous and we cannot compare the discount factor in equation
(22) with the one in (6).
However, we get
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜i
= 0 =
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜j
∀i = {1, 2}, j = {3, ..., n}. (23)
Thus, for a low cost firm, tax harmonization (whether base or rate) does not aﬀect
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the decision to leave the cartel. The intuition is that there is always another identical
firm and the critical discount factor is only driven by the number of countries, be-
cause there are additional profits (which are proportionally increasing in the number
of countries) only in the deviation phase. Hence, we conclude
Proposition 4. If the number of countries increases (n > 2) and
(i) if there is only one low-tax country, all results from the two-country setting
are preserved qualitatively.
(ii) if there are at least two identical low-tax countries within the Union, neither
coordination in tax rates nor in tax bases has any influence on cartel stability.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that harmonization of tax rates and tax bases aﬀects the sta-
bility of international cartels and that for the reasonable assumption of incomplete
tax deductible expenses, both bilateral and unilateral harmonization stabilizes col-
lusive agreements. Unilateral harmonization to a minimum standard is preferable to
bilateral harmonization in the sense that it has a smaller eﬀect on the incentive to
stay in the cartel. Our results strengthen previous arguments against harmonization
brought forward in the public choice literature (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan) per-
taining to collusive behavior by governments, and are also in line with more recent
studies, which show that tax harmonization is generally undesirable (e.g., Haufler
and Schjelderup, 2004).
An issue that has not been explicitly analyzed in this paper is how harmonization
aﬀects international cartels when one firm is located outside the harmonizing area.
The answer to this question, however, follows from our analysis. Harmonization to a
minimum standard, say, on average raises the tax wedge and thus the eﬀective cost
of the low tax firm in the harmonizing area, thereby reducing its incentive to defect
and export into the outside firm’s market. For the firm located outside the Union, the
eﬀect of harmonization depends on its cost (dis-)advantage. If it has lower costs than
any firm located in the Union, harmonization makes it more attractive to export
to the harmonizing area since eﬀective costs there have gone up. Thus profit in the
deviating as well as in the punishment phase of the game has risen. If the outside
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firm has higher costs, harmonization in the Union strengthens the incentive of the
outside firm to remain in the cartel. Taken together, harmonization has a dual eﬀect:
on the one hand it stabilizes and segments cartels within the harmonizing union, but
it may, on the other hand, decrease or increase the incentive to defect in a market
with firms located outside the harmonizing union. In the latter case, however, for
the area that harmonizes, losing market shares to a foreign firm must be traded oﬀ
against the benefits to consumers from lower prices.
Appendix
As it is always the low-cost firm which is more likely to leave the cartel, we have to
diﬀerentiate its critical discount factor,
θ¯
m
i =
α2i
α2i − 8αj(c˜j − c˜i)
, (24)
for the changes in tax rates resp. deductibility factors in order to get the eﬀects of
harmonization on cartel stability. This gives
dθ¯
m
i =
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜i
· ∂c˜i
∂²i
· ∂²i
∂ti
· dti + ∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜j
· ∂c˜j
∂²j
· ∂²j
∂tj
· dtj (25)
and
dθ¯
m
i =
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜i
· ∂c˜i
∂²i
· ∂²i
∂γi
· dγi +
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜j
· ∂c˜j
∂²j
· ∂²j
∂γj
· dγj. (26)
Therefore, we need
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜i
= −2αi [α
2
i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)] + α2i (6αi − 8(c˜j − c˜i))
[α2i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)]
2 < 0 (27)
∂c˜i
∂²i
= c =
∂c˜j
∂²j
> 0 (28)
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜j
=
8α2i [αj − (c˜j − c˜i)]
[α2i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)]
2 =
8α2i [αi − 2 (c˜j − c˜i)]
[α2i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)]
2 > 0, (29)
where the inequality in (27) and (29) holds because αi−2 (c˜j − c˜i) > 0 from πE > 0
in equation (5).
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Moreover, we have ²i =
1−γiti
1−ti and thus
∂²i
∂γi
= − ti
1− ti
< 0 (30)
and
∂²i
∂ti
=
1− γi
(1− ti)2
(
> 0 if γi < 1
< 0 if γi > 1
. (31)
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